Written by César Morales Oyarvide   

In Mexico argumentation is replaced by political or journalistic declarations with a worrisome frequency. Declarations that most of the times are made without empirical support and create myths, exaggerations and inventions that throw more shade than light on the problems of violence and insecurity that currently affect the country. The star within this mythology is without a doubt the idea of the “colombianization”: a concept used by some politicians (not only Mexicans) and mass media that has become the maximum warning of what it is necessary to avoid or the unstoppable end of the path we’re walking on. Although I strongly disagree with this construction, is interesting to discuss it because its success show the degree of misunderstanding that is present when speaking of the violence, the drug trafficking and its relation with the Mexican State.

What are we talking about?

In the last decades “Colombia”, as pointed by sociologist Fernando Escalante, has become not only an exemplary case, but almost a concept. A shady concept, yes, but one that brings clear images of a country in which the violence has surpassed the State by the conjunction of phenomena like drug trafficking, guerrilla and “paramilitarismo”, along with a weak State without capacity to control extensive territories, mainly in rural areas. Certainly, in contemporary Mexico all these elements are present in some degree... but does that mean the inevitable “colombianization” of the country?

Hardly, if we pay attention to the fact that one of these elements (the relative weakness of the State) is shared practically by all the countries of the subcontinent. In addition, and here it is the most important thing I try to show, the drug trafficking organizations, the guerrilla, the violence, and their relation with the State has been and is currently quite different in Mexico and Colombia. Those differences make me believe it is not likely that Mexico is undergoing a “colombianization” process.

The differences

First of all, we have two very different profiles of drug traffickers: on the one hand, the Colombian “narcos” have dedicated themselves mainly to the production of an expensive drug: cocaine, in which they have (at least since the 80’s), a situation similar to a monopoly. Their main comparative advantage is their capacity for the production of “coca” in rural areas almost without State presence and in many cases controlled by guerrilla organizations. On the other hand, the drug business in Mexico doesn’t focus on production, but on the contraband in the border with the United States. Yes, there has been a centennial production of poppy and marijuana (cheap drugs) in Mexico but the illegal business par excellence in this country has always been the contraband. Drug smuggling with an urban and border-located profile, in cities where the drug arrives with its value multiplied several times and where the drug smuggling organizations have prospered. In addition, the traffic in Mexico has been developed without links with guerrilla organizations.

In second place, the differences in the guerrillas of both countries are clear: the Mexican EPR or the ERPI cannot be compared with the Colombian FARC in any aspect. And besides, the symbiosis between “narco” and guerilla is never automatic nor is free of its own problems.

In third place, the profiles of the violence in both countries are also very different, something that the idea of the “colombianization” disguises: the Colombia of the 80’s (that is, the one that is used in the comparison) was a country with several armed conflicts: the one of the “narcos” against the State, the one of the guerrilla against the State, the one of paramilitary against guerrillas and left-wing organizations, and the one of all of them against the civil population: it was a country where well-spread political violence existed. At this moment a comparable kind of political violence does not exist in Mexico: the violence in this country is essentially criminal violence (with exceptions) that is explained by an accumulation of factors: the gradual decline of the informal pacts and mechanisms of control of the PRI regime, a change within the relation of balance between the drug trafficking organizations, the failed strategy of the government centered in the military and the punitive, and the increase of the drug use. There have been some changes and a worrisome scaled in the last couple of years (a “crime wave”) but different from what happened in Colombia.

Last but not least, it’s necessary to point out the difference in the historical relation between the “narco” and the State in Mexico and Colombia. Experts like sociologist Luis Astorga have indicated in numerous occasions that the Mexican drug dealing organizations (since their origin in the dawn of XXth century) were always a part of the apparatus of the political regime, but were relegated to positions of subordination, following the rules imposed by the political power. This is equivalent to say that Mexico has been historically the antithesis of what was called in Colombia “narcopolítica”. In the Andean country, quite differently, the drug trafficking organizations appeared much later (in the middle of the century), and were born separated from the political power.

Who benefits from these myths?

Once some of the main differences between Mexico and Colombia in terms of drug trafficking, violence, guerrilla, and their relation to the State, one question remains: who benefits from this idea of “colombianization”, from this myth? First of all, it’s not crazy to think that the declarations of politicians, military and police chiefs related to the danger of the “colombianization” and the strength of the great criminal organizations that “threaten the sovereignty of the country” are a resource used to justify their defeats easily and to magnify their relative successes. And secondly, something more serious: this “invention” is preposterous, unless what it is being looked for is to create a climate of favorable opinion to the militarization of the war against drugs and the use of punitive populism (something that has already occurred), and a greater permissiveness for the interference of the United States in military matter with excuses like the “narcoterrorism” or “narcoinsurgency” (Hillary Clinton dixit). If the “colombianization” is false in its premises, it could be true in its consequences: militarization, and that the US uses aid plans to take part militarily in the country and to turn it into another strategic military zone in complicity with part of the national political class, something similar to what happened in Colombia. And that would indeed be a real problem of national security.

Article by César Morales Oyarvide
@DonGPeregrino